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This text was written in 2012 and will be published as a chapter in an edited 
book about civilian-military relations. It will be published by a US military 
publisher and is aimed primarily at a US military audience.

The Norwegian Approach to Afghanistan:  
Civilian-Military Segregation 
In a way, one could consider Norway a typical example of a small 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partner in Afghan-
istan, with 400 troops at its disposal and responsible for one of 
the 26 provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). Norway is a signa-
tory to the Atlantic Pact and a staunch North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) member. At the same time, the people and the 
government of Norway—like those in many European countries—
share reservations about the extraterritorial use of military force. 
They consider Norway to be a “peace-nation,” a small state with-
out strategic global interests. Norwegian foreign policy favors the 
multilateral institutional approach, providing stability and pre-
dictability through the United Nations (UN). The government of 
Norway has to balance military needs with civilian demands for 
humanitarian aid and the support of human rights—in particular 
women’s rights. In Afghanistan, Norwegian civilian aid priorities 
included the strengthening of Afghan governance capacities, rule 
of law, education, and rural development. 
 
Understanding Norway’s approach to civilian-military relations 
in international operations requires one to look at both the tacti-
cal/operational (theatre) and the strategic levels. Challenges 
identified in the field are often rooted in higher-level differences 
in policy between ministries, departments, and agencies. There is 
a certain tendency to overlook this fact in studies of PRTs, civil-
ian-military coordination, and other instances of civilian-military 
interaction. Therefore, this chapter begins with an exploration of 
the Norwegian strategic approach to Afghanistan and then pro-
ceeds to the tactical, PRT application. I will demonstrate that 
there was deep-rooted resistance among civilian actors to close 
collaboration with the military, based on a fear of “militarization 
of aid.” This resulted in strong divisions and stovepiping in the 
PRT. While Norwegian civilian aid has several positive features 
compared to many other donor countries, I also argue that the 
insistence on separation of all civilian and military efforts to a 
large extent is based on a flawed conflation of humanitarian and 
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development aid and the reluctance by the government to priori-
tize among security, development, or humanitarian efforts. 
Strategic Level 
Norwegian Aid and Foreign Policy Traditions 
The Norwegian government has a long tradition of utilizing civil 
society in providing aid and support to development overseas—
both in crisis response and development aid. UN agencies and 
Norwegian nongovernmental organizations (NGO) have often 
been the implementers of Norwegian humanitarian and devel-
opment programs. This outsourcing has provided the government 
with flexibility, as it could respond quickly to crises by support-
ing local and international NGOs already present in the field. Fur-
thermore, it has sometimes shielded the government from criti-
cism as the implementers have been ‘nongovernmental’ and 
therefore not representatives of official Norwegian foreign policy. 
However, this policy has also strengthened the NGO community 
in Norway, and they have become significant political players. 
Some commentators describe it as an “aid industry,” with too 
much influence on foreign development policies.1 Per capita, 
Norway is an “aid superpower,” having more than tripled its de-
velopment budget since 1990, and is one of the few countries 
that meet the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment target of aid, amounting to seven-tenths percent of the 
gross national income.2 Yet, Norway has been reluctant to attach 
conditions or political demands to these vast aid resources.3 Fur-
thermore, the Norwegian government and public have consid-
ered the aid to be apolitical, founded on altruistic principles and 
universal values, even if it simultaneously promotes politically 
laden concepts such as “the principles of the rule of law, political 
pluralism and democracy.”4 
                                                 
1  Terje Tvedt, “International Development Aid and Its Impact on a Donor Country: A 
Case Study of Norway,” European Journal of Development Research 19, no. 4 (De-
cember 2007): 614–635. 
2  See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Development Aid 
Rose in 2009 and Most Donors Will Meet 2010 Aid Targets,” 14 April 2010, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3343,en_2649_34487_44981579_1_1_1_1,
00.html. 
3  See Terje Tvedt, “International Development Aid and Its Impact.” Scandinavian 
readers may also consult Terje Tvedt, Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. 
Den norske modellen (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2003). 
4  See Stortinget, Felles kamp mot fattigdom. En helhetlig utviklingspolitikk, 
Stortingsmelding 35, 2003–4 (Oslo, Norway: Stortinget, 2004); and the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
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Consistent with this apolitical policy position, Norway has nur-
tured a self-image as a peace nation, e.g. the nation’s status as 
the awarder of the annual Nobel Peace Prize and a strong sup-
porter of the UN. It is well-positioned to gain trust from all parties 
in conflicts. Thus, Norway welcomes the opportunity to use its 
good reputation, good offices, and good economy to mediate 
numerous contentious international disputes from the Middle 
East to Sri Lanka to Sudan. In other words, Oslo has the will and 
the way. While these mediations have not always been success-
ful, they have enhanced Norway’s international standing and 
self-image.5 
 
Norway’s ISAF participation in Afghanistan came as something 
new and challenging to this altruistic peace identity, since it im-
plied taking sides in a conflict and using military means. Norway 
suddenly became a more political actor than had previously been 
the case, with the military helping the Kabul government to ex-
pand control over its sovereign territory and help fight against 
insurgents. Norwegian military and civilian actors in the PRTs 
had to find a new paradigm for working alongside each other in 
the field. These changes proved difficult to reconcile with Nor-
way’s identity as a nonpolitical, altruistic, peace-loving nation 
and complicated the previously harmonious or neutral relation-
ship between the Norwegian government and civil society actors. 
The Norwegian Approach to Afghanistan 
According to former Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr 
Støre, Norway’s participation in Afghanistan advanced the goals 
of establishing security and stability, preventing terrorism, and 
fostering development in a manner appropriate for Afghan socie-
ty:  
 
First, the purpose of Norway’s presence in Afghanistan is to promote social and 
economic development in the country and stability in the region. We will help to 
                                                 
(NORAD), “Grant Schemes for Humanitarian Assistance and Development 
Cooperation by Norwegian and International Voluntary Actors: Guidelines,” 2001,  
http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?
key=129252. 
5 See: Øystein Haga Skånland, “‘Norway Is a Peace Nation’: A Discourse Analytic 
Reading of the Norwegian Peace Engagement,” Cooperation and Conflict 45, no. 1 
(March 2010): 34–54; Christopher S. Browning, “Branding Nordicity, Models, 
Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism,” Cooperation and Conflict 42, no. 1 
(March 2007): 27–51; Mark Leonard and Andrew Small, “Norwegian Public 
Diplomacy,” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, 
 http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/public.pdf. 
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build Afghan capacity to provide security and development, and we intend to 
strengthen the UN’s coordinating role.  
 
Our aim is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for international terror-
ism.  
 
Afghanistan must therefore be further stabilised. Social and political nation-
building and state-building in Afghanistan are not merely goals in their own 
right; they are measures to make the country more stable. . . . 
 
Second, there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. . . . A 
political solution must therefore be found. And it must be firmly rooted in 
Afghan society. 
 
Third, a military presence will be necessary on the way towards a political solu-
tion. Not just as a means of resolving the conflict, but [also] to provide sufficient 
security to create a space in which political and economic development are 
possible. . . .6 
 
Based on these stated goals, it appears that the security and civil-
ian dimensions were well integrated in Norwegian strategic 
thinking. The interdependence of civilian, political, and military 
progress was explicit. To facilitate such coordination, the gov-
ernment established a cross-ministerial body, called the Afghani-
stan Forum. Here the state secretaries (deputy ministers) of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Defence (MOD), and Justice 
(MOJ; equivalent to a Ministry of Interior), as well as the Office of 
the Prime Minister politically coordinated Norwegian engage-
ment in Afghanistan. They prepared the government decisions 
related to all Afghanistan policy and supplied the government 
with coherent input and advice on priorities. They also traveled 
jointly to Afghanistan. The higher level of the civil service, where 
the chief officials coordinated policy implementation, mirrored 
this political structure. The Norwegian embassy in Kabul was al-
so partly linked to this structure.7 The purpose was thus, by and 
large, to streamline Norway’s policy and expand ownership of its 
Afghanistan engagement beyond the MOD and specialized MFA 
circles. 
 
                                                 
6  Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian Foreign Minister, “Address to the Storting on the 
Situation in Afghanistan and Norway’s Civilian and Military Engagement in the 
Country,” (address, The Storting, Oslo, Norway, 9 February 2010),  
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-and-
articles/speeches_foreign/2010/afghanistan_address.html. 
7  Cedric de Coning, Helge Lurås, Niels Nagelhus Schia, and Ståle Ulriksen, Norway’s 
Whole-of-Government Approach and Its Engagement with Afghanistan (Oslo, Nor-
way: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2009), 26–28. 
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However, this was an ad hoc arrangement established for en-
gagement in Afghanistan only. It was not backed-up by a perma-
nent secretariat or a formalized organization of any kind. Fur-
thermore, in contrast to many other similar-sized countries, such 
as Sweden and Finland, there existed no government-level politi-
cal strategy paper for the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan 
or stability operations as a whole. Only partisan statements by 
government representatives when addressing the parliament or 
the media indicated the Norwegian strategy, like the previously 
mentioned quote from former foreign minister Gahr Støre. The 
Afghanistan Forum appeared to operationalize such sentiments 
supporting civilian-military coordination. Despite this, the inter-
action became much less apparent in the specialized ministries or 
branches. 
Development Aid 
Norwegian support to Afghanistan was significant because it tar-
geted and aimed at sustainability, providing the host authorities 
some leverage to actually run their own country. Norway was a 
significant contributor to Afghanistan development aid in rela-
tion to Norway’s gross domestic product and spent almost as 
much on development aid as on military operations. The Norwe-
gian government pledge approximately $120–130 million dol-
lars annually in humanitarian and development aid for the peri-
od 2010–2015.8 In 2009 the bilateral aid amounted to $126 mil-
lion, which was distributed as follows: 37 percent to economic 
development and trade, 30 percent to good governance, 19 per-
cent to health and education, and 14 percent to humanitarian 
aid.9 
 
A leading principle for Norwegian donor funds was that they are 
dispersed without earmarks or conditions and in close collabora-
tion with local authorities and major international actors (like the 
World Bank and United Nations Development Program) and to 
Norwegian and international NGOs. Approximately one-third of 
the Norwegian support to Afghanistan was channeled through a 
World Bank administered trust fund, the Afghanistan Recon-
struction Trust Fund. This and other similar funds provided the 
Afghan government with resources to cover budgetary expenses, 
                                                 
8  Gahr Støre, “Address to the Storting.” 
9  See NORAD, “Afghanistan,” 28 June 2012, http://www.norad.no/no/om-
bistand/landsider/asia-og-oseania/afghanistan. 
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such as salaries, while the World Bank maintained a level of in-
fluence and controlled corruption or the misallocation of funds. 
This model also provided the Afghan authorities the opportunity 
to define their own development priorities and the resources to 
implement projects  
 
A common challenge for foreign donors in Afghanistan was that 
too often local or international contractors and NGOs distributed 
the funds directly to the field. Additionally, the funds dispersed 
to the local government often were earmarked. It was estimated 
that about two-thirds of all development expenditure in Afghani-
stan bypassed the government. As a result, local Afghan authori-
ties were effectively undermined.10 In this context, Norway did 
relatively well, channelling aid through the trust funds. 
 
Furthermore, Norwegian foreign aid strategy did not “buy stabil-
ity” or “reward instability” in the sense that it was being spent in 
the parts of the country where the insurgency was the strongest. 
Several commentators have pointed out the paradox of the inter-
national community spending most of their funds on trouble-
some areas to win the peace, while communities are, in a sense, 
“penalized for being peaceful.”11 Norwegian aid largely attempt-
ed to counter such trends by focusing on the central government. 
Only approximately 15 percent of the above-mentioned $126 
million in civilian funds were allocated to the Faryab district, 
where the Norwegian PRT was located. Some of these funds were 
later allocated to Faryab, but it was accomplished through na-
tional authorities.12 
 
However, the Norwegian development and humanitarian aid ap-
proach appeared to have been formed in relative isolation from 
the security and military priorities. There was no reference, for 
example, to the ISAF priorities in the documents of the Norwe-
                                                 
10  See Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “Afghanistan: Gov’t Ques-
tions Effectiveness of Foreign Aid Billions,” Afghanistan Online, 7 May 2007, 
http://www.afghan-web.com/economy/foreignaid_effect.html. 
11  Matt Waldman, Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, Agency Coordina-
tion Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) Advocacy Series (Kabul, Afghanistan: ACBAR, 
March 2008,  
http://www.oxfam.org.nz/sites/default/files/reports/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiven
ess%20Paper.pdf. See also Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy 
America Love,” Foreign Policy, 1 December 2009,  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/01/money_cant_buy_america_lov
e. 
12  It may be argued that the very idea of building a strong centralized state in Afghani-
stan is futile, given the traditionally relative strength of the regions and districts, 
but that is not the topic for this article. 
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gian Agency for Development Aid (NORAD), except a statement 
that Norway promoted regular contact with the armed forces. 
Nowhere was the role of development aid in relation to security 
discussed and defined, and there were no guidelines or priorities 
from the government in this regard. Norwegian policy appeared 
to largely ignore the fact that security was a key priority in the 
Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Afghan 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG).13 Hence, despite the 
words of the government and the existence of an Afghanistan Fo-
rum, coordination between the security and development do-
mains was largely nonexistent. As shall be described, this trans-
cended to the tactical level as well. 
Tactical Level 
Guiding Principles 
The Norwegian humanitarian and development communities and 
many sections within the MFA were from the outset skeptical 
about the very idea of a PRT with respect to the integration of mil-
itary and civilian roles. For them, separation of civilian and mili-
tary activity was crucial and the primacy of UN principles of hu-
manitarian assistance was deeply rooted. The Norwegian gov-
ernment thus referred to UN guidelines and principles for civil-
ian-military interaction.14 A key document in this regard was the 
1994 UN “Oslo Guidelines,” regulating the use of military assets 
in disaster operations, and the subsequent 2003 UN “Guidelines 
on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United 
Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.”15 The 
UN developed several other guidelines for Afghanistan specifical-
ly, including the 2008 “Guidelines for the Interaction and Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghan-
                                                 
13  The government of Afghanistan has even added a ninth Millennium goal, “Enhance 
Security,” to the eight global MDGs, recognizing the critical role of peace and secu-
rity in achieving the other MDGs. See  
http://www.undp.org.af/demo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
62&Itemid=68 and Erin Foster, “Afghanistan: Social Well-Being: The Millennium 
Development Goals,” Civil-Military Fusion Centre 4, no. 10 (5 October 2010), 3, 
https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Social%20Well-
being%20Archive/SWB_Monthly_October_6%20October%5B1%5D.pdf. 
14  Arne Strand, “Drawing the Lines: the Norwegian Debate on Civilian-Military Rela-
tions in Afghanistan,”  Noref Policy Brief 8 (June 2010). 
15   http://www.coe-dmha.org/Media/Guidance/3MCDAGuidelines.pdf. See also Cedric 
de Coning, “Civil-Military Relations and U.N. Peacekeeping Operations,” World Pol-
itics Review, 19 May 2010,  
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5553/civil-military-relations-and-u-
n-peacekeeping-operations. 
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istan.”16 The Afghan PRT executive steering committee also is-
sued guideliens.17 
 
All these guidelines recommended a clear distinction between 
humanitarian and military activity. The guidelines issued by the 
Afghan PRT executive steering committee stated that “humani-
tarian assistance is that which is life saving and addresses urgent 
and life-threatening humanitarian needs. It must not be used for 
the purpose of political gain, relationship building, or ‘winning 
hearts and minds.’ ”18 (emphasis in original) 
 
In addition, the PRT Guidelines also stressed that United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan(UNAMA) was the lead agency 
when it came to provincial development, and that “the PRTs 
should [have] support[ed] UNAMA offices and follow[ed] guid-
ance provided by UNAMA and other concerned donors on this 
issue.”19 Based on such guidelines and the strong support for the 
UN in the NGOs and the MFA, the government sought to keep ci-
vilian and military efforts strictly separated in its Afghan policy 
and in the PRT.20 
The Norwegian PRT Structure  
The mandate of the NATO PRTs in Afghanistan was to promote secu-
rity and good governance and to facilitate development and recon-
struction, all in close collaboration with the government of Afghani-
stan and the Afghan National Security Forces.
21
  
 
                                                 
16  https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/ Guidelines%20 Afghanistan %2 0%2 
0v.% 201.0%202008.pdf; 
17  https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/PRT%20CONFERENCE%202010/ 
PRT_ESC_Charter.pdf. See also IRIN, “Afghanistan: How Should Aid Workers, Mili-
tary Personnel Interact?” 28 October 2009, 
 http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=86776. 
18 PRT Executive Steering Committee, “PRT Executive Steering Committee Policy Note 
Number 3”, Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 21 March 2010,  
https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/PRT%20CONFERENCE%202010/Policy_N
ote_3_Humanitarian_Assistance.pdf.  
19  PRT Executive Steering Committee, “PRT Executive Steering Committee Policy Note 
Number 1”, Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 21 March 2010,   
https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/PRT%20CONFERENCE%202010/Policy_N
ote_1_Engagement_in_Provincial_Development.pdf. 
20 The “humanitarian space” refers to purely humanitarian projects, which are 
considered nonpolitical and based on international humanitarian law. The guiding 
principle for humanitarian agencies is often referred to as the “humanitarian 
imperative” and often summarized as independence, impartiality, and neutrality. 
See International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Code of 
Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in 
Disaster Relief (Geneva, Switzerland: International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, 1995). 
21  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATOs and Afghanistan,” 03 December 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm. 
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The Norwegian-led PRT consisted of approximately 400 soldiers 
(including 100 from Latvia) and some 10 to 20 civilians. They 
were based in Meymaneh in the Faryab district in northwestern 
Afghanistan. The civilian group typically had a civilian coordina-
tor, a political adviser, development advisers, police advisers, 
and prison advisers, mainly from Norway but also from Iceland 
and Latvia. The civilians and the military were colocated and 
were placed under certain common military security regulations 
but operated otherwise separately. 
 
The civilian members of the Norwegian-led PRT were divided into 
at least two groups: the police and prison advisers and the politi-
cal and development advisers. The role of the political and devel-
opment advisers was to oversee the implementation of develop-
ment programs; liaise with the local authorities, the UN and oth-
ers; and help to develop new projects and programs funded by 
the MFA through the embassy in Kabul. As in most other PRTs, 
none of the civilians were under the command of the military 
contingent. They coordinated with the embassy in Kabul and 
with relevant ministries and directorates in Oslo.  
 
Nor was the military under civilian command. The military chain 
of command went through Regional Command North (RC N), 
ISAF HQ and the rest of the NATO structure, in addition to the 
Norwegian Operational Command and the MOD in Norway. 
 
Therefore, in practice, it was two parallel structures sharing the 
same compound. There was no tactical (Meymaneh/Faryab) or 
operational (Kabul) headquarters or equivalent of the Oslo Af-
ghanistan Forum. The civilians and the military may have coor-
dinated, but it was all based on goodwill, not on institutionalized 
procedures or regulations. There was no common higher level of 
command to refer to in case of conflict.22 As a result, the degree 
of cooperation differed significantly from contingent to contin-
gent, and the institutional memory was limited. It was only re-
cently that the civilian and military structures initiated joint ex-
ercises prior to deployment. Different rotation cycles also ham-
pered these exercises. 
 
                                                 
22 For more details on the PRT model, see de Coning et al., Norway’s Whole-of-
Government Approach, 29–33. 
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An additional challenge was the absence of a common plan. A 
“Faryab strategy” was developed in 2009, but it represented 
more of a lowest common denominator between ministries and 
other relevant agencies than a strategy.23 As in the United States 
and elsewhere, good ambitions were plentiful, but they were not 
organized in a prioritized way in terms of time or resources. This 
all seemed to represent a compromise and not a political agenda, 
and as a planning tool, it was of limited value for the PRT. 
 
Furthermore, the political and development advisers may have 
been considered the extended arm of the embassy, but they had 
weak direct links to Oslo. The civilian coordinator and political 
advisors typically were younger civil servants, not career diplo-
mats with a good foothold and network in the embassy or MFA in 
Oslo. Being deployed to the PRT was not career-boosting for dip-
lomats, so recruitment was difficult. The development advisors 
were also externally recruited personnel without much network 
in the MFA or NORAD. Therefore, they were not in a particularly 
strong position for implementing Norwegian foreign policy or in-
fluencing the more senior PRT commander—typically a lieuten-
ant colonel in rank. There was little doubt that it was the military 
that was the stronger component, both in terms of personnel and 
operational capacity. The Norwegian armed forces has gradually 
transformed from a peacekeeping-style force to a credible coun-
terinsurgency (COIN) force, with better equipment and better 
fighting skills. This may have deepened the divisions to the civil-
ians further. As a result of this, there was no common Norwegian 
political strategy—no common planning, monitoring, or evalua-
tion of the efforts made in the various sectors where Norway was 
engaged in Faryab. The civilian and military activities and pro-
jects were not being knitted together into a comprehensive strat-
egy to maximize the political effects and fulfill the mandate. 
 
As previously mentioned, the Norwegian NGOs were particularly 
critical of the PRT concept in its early years. They viewed PRTs as 
disregarding or blurring the lines between humanitarian and mil-
itary spaces. 
                                                 
23  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice and the Po-
lice, A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Far-
yab Province, Afghanistan (Oslo, Norway: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Defense and Ministry of Justice and the Police, May 2009),  
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Strategy_Norway-in-Faryab-
Afghanistan.pdf. 
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The civilian actors feared being subsumed to the military opera-
tions and being regarded as the extended hand of the military. 
They typically argued that militarization of aid was short-sighted 
and unsustainable and that military-driven aid projects, aid 
aimed at winning hearts and minds, threw money at a problem 
rather than address the underlying cause of the instability.24 Fur-
thermore, many Norwegian NGOs contended that using money as 
a weapons system was not only unsustainable, it may also have 
unintended adverse effects and even create instability. Pumping 
money into local societies often led to corruption, tribal in-
fighting over access to the funds, and increased revenues to the 
insurgency groups.25 Such critiques were widely referred to in the 
Norwegian debates, further legitimizing and strengthening the 
policy of separation of military and civilian roles. Given the pre-
viously mentioned strong role of the NGOs in the Norwegian pub-
lic discourse, the government was not willing or able to confront 
them and generally complied with their demands for such sepa-
ration. 
 
However, the military had also criticized the government and 
NGOs for bypassing local authorities when implementing projects 
in Faryab and for ignoring the political and social considerations. 
It was argued that unevenly dispersed aid contributed to 
strengthening insurgents in the province.26 The government and 
the NGO community have resisted attempts by the military to 
strengthen coordination. As a result, the military faced difficul-
ties in implementing the COIN strategy directed from ISAF com-
mand. While conducting successful “clear” operations, they 
lacked the “hold” and “build” elements required to succeed. A 
replacement for the reluctant Norwegian partners was to some 
extent found in USAID, which began implementing projects in 
the Faryab region thereafter. For the Norwegian PRT, cooperation 
with USAID proved more fruitful, as they appeared more inclined 
                                                 
24  Lars Akerhaug and Lars Inge Staveland, “Norge og USA vurderer bistand ulikt,” 
Aftenposten (Norway), 13 October 2010,  
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/--Norge-og-USA-vurderer-bistand-ulikt-
5349087.html. 
25  Wilder and Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy America Love.” 
26  Rune Solberg, “Bistand på ville veier” Aftenposten (Norway), 6 December 2010, 
http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/Bistand-p-ville-veier-
6274301.html. 
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to cooperate toward a common COIN goal. The Norwegian NGOs 
predictably criticized this cooperation.27 
Conflation of Humanitarian and Development Aid 
There was, however, a fundamental flaw in the position of the 
Norwegian civilian component, which was primarily the NGO po-
sition. While humanitarian aid in principle could be regarded as 
apolitical, development aid, it can be argued, was inherently po-
litical. There could be little doubt that the Norwegian objectives 
in Afghanistan, like those of the UN and the wider international 
community, were highly political. Development programs aimed 
at, for example, poverty reduction were political, as they recom-
mended one set of principles over others, whether governance, 
economic, or legal. It was a question of taking sides in an internal 
violent conflict, supporting one set of values (liberal-democratic) 
and one set of actors (the authorities).28 The model advanced typ-
ically was based upon Western or UN best practices, supporting 
liberal-democratic values over those of the authoritarianism and 
usually implying redistribution of resources, changes in power 
structures, or strengthening of a group of actors. The defense of 
the humanitarian space therefore could not rightly be expanded 
to include development aid or other programs in which NGOs 
were engaged.29 The previously mentioned guidelines of the UN 
and PRT executive steering committee all referred to the relation-
ship between the military and the humanitarian actors, not the 
development actors. But many NGOs and the Norwegian govern-
ment tended to ignore this fact. 
 
The insurgents tended to object to several elements of the MDG, 
the ANDS, and the Norwegian development aid criteria. They also 
found objectionable many key Norwegian values, like democrati-
zation, empowering women, and the rule of law. 
 
By conflating the humanitarian and development programs, the 
NGOs were denying the political role and potential powerful po-
litical influence such programs wielded, while simultaneously 
                                                 
27  Tor Aksel Bolle, “Forsvaret danser tett med USAID i Afghanistan,” Bistandsaktuelt 
(Norway), 8, 2010, 4–8. 
28  Jens Stoltenberg, “Derfor er Norge i Afghanistan,” Aftenposten (Norway), 22 
November 2007. 
29  Sylvain Beauchamp, Defining the Humanitarian Space through Public International 
Law, (Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Red Cross, 2008): 16,  
http://www.redcross.ca/cmslib/general/obeoc_beauchamp.pdf. 
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unnecessarily resisting cooperation with other actors, such as the 
military. Furthermore, insufficient political analysis and sensitiv-
ity may have caused development projects to aggravate rather 
than mitigate tensions. An internal report by NORAD revealed 
that there was an ethnic imbalance in Faryab, in the sense that 
the Uzbek communities received substantially more aid than the 
Pashtuns. This caused tensions in the latter group who already 
had been a recruitment base for local insurgents.30 
 
Despite arguments for keeping humanitarian and military opera-
tions separate, there are valid reasons why development pro-
grams should plan and evaluate in a coordinated manner with 
the military, to ensure that resources are coherently spent and to 
maximize political efficiency. All Norwegian development aid to 
Afghanistan should have, in principle, aimed at the same politi-
cal objectives—those defined by the Afghan and Norwegian au-
thorities. If civilian agencies were concerned with the militariza-
tion of aid, there were even more reasons for them to engage with 
the military and confirm that political development efforts were 
done “right.” 
 
All actors seem to agree that to achieve sustainable security, mili-
tary solutions alone are insufficient. Yet, civilians can be reluc-
tant to contribute to the security domain or to fill the gaps un-
addressed by the military. Many NGOs do not consider security to 
be their priority, and thus design their projects based on other 
sets of criteria, such as advancing health, wellbeing, and human 
rights. As long as the Norwegian government accepts and sup-
ports the separation of development aid and security operations, 
NGOs are unlikely to change their position. Only through donor 
guidance can development projects be tuned toward achieving 
long-term political effects that enhance the security situation. 
 
Of course, it may be argued that with only 400 troops in a district 
(Faryab) of approximately one million people, it would not have 
made much difference whether the civilian-military coordination 
was better. There were arguably far too few boots on the ground 
to be able to provide security for all citizens or to play a decisive 
                                                 
30 Lars Inge Staveland, “U-hjelp kan skape mer konflikt,” Aftenposten, 4 November 
2010, http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/--U-hjelp-kan-skape-mer-konflikt-
5351336.html; Geert Gompelman, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Rela-
tionship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Faryab Province (Boston: Fein-
stein International Center, Tufts University, January 2011). 
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political role. That may very well be the case, but the purpose in 
this analysis is to draw operational lessons for future deploy-
ments. Improved coordination will in most cases increase effi-
ciency, reduce expenses, and possibly save lives—even if it by 
itself is not sufficient to win a war or build peace. 
Conclusion 
Norway was not alone in many of the challenges facing the civil-
ian-military relationships described above. All those who are en-
gaged in the Afghan field had to contend with conflicting man-
dates, visions, priorities, and perceptions among civilian and mil-
itary partners. Despite these pressures, the Norwegian approach 
to civilian-military interaction had certain positive features. The 
civilian aid was significant, almost equal to the military spend-
ing, and a large chunk of the civilian aid was provided to the lo-
cal authorities through established multilateral mechanisms such 
as trust funds. This approach promoted local ownership and sus-
tainability, as it countered the tendency to reward instability and 
allowed for higher levels of development aid. As such, these 
characteristics go beyond the tactical use of aid and contribute to 
a strategic approach. The development aid generally supported 
the greater international programs in Afghanistan with consider-
able discretion afforded to the field rather than invented in Oslo. 
 
On the negative side, the Norwegian conflation of humanitarian 
and development aid promoted a perception of the militarization 
of aid and humanitarian space, and thereby stalled a potentially 
fruitful cooperation between development and military actors. 
Despite former Foreign Minister Gahr Støre’s emphasis on politi-
cal-military interdependence, this was hardly followed in prac-
tice. Political development aid was not designed in conjunction 
with security/military efforts. This was also the main reason why 
there was no operational level coordination, for example in the 
embassy in Kabul, between the military and civilian development 
actors. It may also explain why Norway did not have an official 
strategy generally for Afghanistan or specifically for Faryab (the 
existing one was a strategy in name only), as it would have forced 
the government to spell out priorities between the security, de-
velopment, and humanitarian sectors. 
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Instead the political elite tended to avoid this debate altogether, 
continuing instead to attempt several things at the same time. 
The underlying assumption must have been that these ends 
could be achieved independent of each other, or at least that they 
were not in conflict, so that tighter coordination was not needed. 
This was a questionable assumption that reflected the wider 
problem facing the international community in Afghanistan. As 
long as key actors had significantly different perceptions, objec-
tives, and solutions and were reluctant to acknowledge these dif-
ferences, the prospects for enhanced civilian-military coopera-
tion and for sustainable peace remained grim. 
 
What appeared to be the trend among many ISAF countries is to 
lower the ambition on the civilian-military cooperation. This is 
partly due to challenges such as those Norway faced, but also a 
general “Afghanistan-fatigue” among donors as a result of lim-
ited progress in both security and development. The military 
component is increasing their efforts to train local security forces 
and is, to a lesser extent, engaged in the whole civilian spectrum 
of efforts as prescribed in the COIN doctrines. 
 
Perhaps the vision of civilian-military cooperation became too 
ambitious in Afghanistan. The military could not and should not 
become dependent upon developments in the civilian sector to 
achieve military ends. The COIN doctrines had very valuable in-
sights into the importance of understanding the political-cultural 
context and the need for sustainable governance. But they may 
have confused war and nation-building. The latter usually re-
quires a political settlement to succeed; it is a way to stabilize a 
fragile peace agreement. It is far more challenging—if indeed 
possible—to build a state to win a war, as parts of the COIN pro-
ponents seem to argue. 
 
What do these lessons from Afghanistan bode for future opera-
tions? First, for civilian-military cooperation to work it must be 
on all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The military op-
erations should be in support of the political objectives, not vice 
versa. Whatever is done on the tactical level should reinforce and 
support long-term civilian strategies on the higher levels. If not, 
there is a risk the disconnect will undermine overall stability ef-
forts. 
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Second, civilian efforts should award peace, e.g. concentrate on 
those areas in the theatre where there is political stability. The 
example of prosperous development is a strong signal to other 
regions. 
 
Third, local ownership is key. Only local people, not foreigners, 
can build sustainable peace. Civilian funds should avoid bypass-
ing local structures even if it means less efficient aid delivery at 
the outset. 
 
Fourth, and as a result of the previous points, civilian-military 
cooperation is most efficient in the stabilization phase of a war, 
when it can reinforce a political settlement. Civilian efforts usual-
ly require more time to achieve the desired political effects than 
military efforts do. As a result, civilian-military cooperation in 
offensive operations is less likely to succeed. 
 
Civilian-military cooperation remains crucial in today’s military 
operations. Campaign phases are not linear, and the stabilization 
phase, with significant civilian-military cooperation, may sud-
denly slide back to violent conflict with less such cooperation. In 
the same way, different geographical areas of the theatre may al-
so experience different levels of stability and hence different de-
grees of civilian-military interaction. This fluidity in today’s con-
flicts requires all actors to know each other well and to be able to 
support each other when in common interest. Improved aware-
ness and knowledge of each other is a precondition for this and 
represents the best way to avoid disappointments, frustrations, 
and false expectations. 
 
